The UK Equality Act - Your Questions Answered

This post was written by Joanna Whiteman and Ruth Bonino.


In this Q&A, we have attempted to cover some of your most frequently asked questions on the UK Equality Act 2010.  This is not intended to be a comprehensive guide of the new provisions, so if you would like further information, please do not hesitate to contact us.


The Equality Act 2010 has been in the press a lot recently. Should we already have taken steps to ensure that our systems are in compliance with it?

The Equality Act 2010 ("the Act") received Royal Assent in April, just before the general election and after a period of intense discussion and debate.  The new coalition government has recently announced that most of the Act's provisions are due to take effect, as planned, from October 2010. However, despite this, questions remain over the more controversial provisions, such as the socio economic duty, gender pay reporting and positive action.

Employers need to act now in order to prepare for the Act, and the action we recommend is set out at the end of this note.  As regards those provisions of the Act where a question mark remains, there is no need to jump the gun - keep a close eye on developments, but be prepared to act as soon as any announcements are made.


I've heard that the Act makes it easier for employees to show they have suffered disability discrimination. Is this true?

The Act introduces some significant changes in the law concerning disability discrimination, and the government has said that these will come into force in October.  The changes have come about because of a recent decision of the House of Lords (London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm (2008)), which rendered the existing protections against disability-related discrimination inadequate.  The changes make it easier for people to show they are disabled and are protected by disability discrimination law.  Two new types of disability discrimination are recognised as unlawful by the Act:

  • Indirect discrimination - under Section 19 of the Act, a person will be indirectly discriminated against if the employer applies a "provision, criterion or practice" that puts people sharing that person's specific disability, at a particular disadvantage. This means, for example, that a job applicant or an employee with dyslexia could claim that a rule that employees must be able to type at a certain speed disadvantages people with dyslexia. Unless the employer can justify this, it would be unlawful.
  • Discrimination arising from disability - under Section 15 of the Act, an employer discriminates against a person when it treats that person less favourably, not because of the disability itself, but because of something arising "in consequence of that person's disability," such as the need to take a period of disability-related absence. For this type of discrimination to occur, the employer must know, or reasonably be expected to know, that the disabled person has a disability. This type of discrimination will be easier for an employee to show since there will be no need to make a comparison with a person who does not have a disability (as is currently the position). It will, however, be possible for an employer to defend a claim by showing that the treatment is justified as being a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

Some aspects of disability discrimination law are not changed by the Act. For example, the Act still requires employers to make reasonable adjustments for disabled employees and does not change the extent to which these are required. However, it may be necessary to review your organisation's policies to ensure that they are up to date and compliant with the current interpretation of "reasonable adjustments."  It will also be advisable to review your policies and practices to ensure that they cover the new definitions of disability discrimination referred to above.

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U.S. Department of Labor Issues Guidance on Requirement That Employers Provide Nursing Mothers With Breaks and Places To Express Breast Milk

This post was written by Daniel J. Moore and Eugene K. Connors.

A little-noticed provision of the 2010 health care reform legislation requires employers to provide nursing mothers with "reasonable break time" to express breast milk for one year after a child's birth.  Section 4207 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148), 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) ("PPACA"), which became effective March 23, 2010, amends the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") to require employers to provide a break each time an employee needs to express milk, in a location other than a bathroom that is "shielded from view and free from intrusion by coworkers and the public."

The Department of Labor ("DOL") has yet to issue regulations defining a "reasonable" break or what sort of location may be used for lactation.  In July 2010, the DOL did release a "Fact Sheet" that says employers should provide break time to express milk "as frequently as needed by the nursing mother," and that the frequency and duration of the breaks will "likely vary" among mothers.  The Fact Sheet also says that the location provided must be a "functional space" for expressing milk, but need not be dedicated solely for a nursing mother's use, as long as it is available whenever needed.  The Fact Sheet, however, is only intended for general information and is not an official statement of the law, like federal regulations.

Although the new law applies to employers of any size, those with fewer than 50 employees need not provide such breaks if doing so "would impose an undue hardship by causing the employer significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer's business."

Under the new law, these breaks may be unpaid.  That is an exception to the FLSA's rule that breaks of fewer than 20 minutes be paid as compensable time.  But employers should look out for more "generous" state or local laws that "trump" that unpaid exception.  This law does not preempt state laws that offer greater protection for nursing mothers who work, and 24 states and the District of Columbia have laws that apply to such employees.

The law itself contains no penalties for violations.  Both penalties and remedies available to aggrieved employees are likely to be in forthcoming DOL regulations.

Feel free to contact a Reed Smith attorney with any questions or concerns about break times for nursing mothers.  Additional information and the full Fact Sheet are accessible through the DOL Wage and Hour Division website.

Illinois Cracks Down on Employers Who Fail to Pay Wages or Vacation Pay

A new law will make it much more costly for Illinois employers that fail to pay employees their earned wages, including final compensation such as accrued but unused vacation pay.  The Illinois Wage Theft Enforcement Act, S.B. 3568 (the "Act"), signed into law July 30, 2010, increases both civil and criminal penalties for violating the state's wage payment law, imposes new risks for employers who ignore or unsuccessfully challenge employees' wage claims, and creates a new cause of action for employees who face retaliation for having complained about unpaid wages.  The Act will take effect January 1, 2011.

Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act

The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (the "Wage Payment Act") requires employers to pay employees their earned wages no later than a specified period following the date on which the wages are earned, and to pay employees who resign or are terminated all wages they earned through their last day of employment, no later than the first regular payroll date thereafter.  The law applies to every employee in Illinois, exempt or non-exempt, regardless of the employer's size or location.  "Earned wages" includes not only an employee's salary or hourly pay, but also any earned bonuses or vacation pay.  With some limited exceptions such as tax withholdings and authorized deductions for benefits, the Wage Payment Act also prohibits employers from deducting anything from an employee's wages, unless the employee signs an authorization at the time of the deduction.  The law also allows employees to recover damages from any corporate officer or agent of an employer who knowingly permits the employer to violate the Wage Payment Act.

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Ninth Circuit Rejects Employer's Effort to Apply Another State's Law to Treat California Workers as Independent Contractors

Tracking the trend of increased federal and state focus on the misclassification of workers, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently applied California law to hold that plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on the merits against their former employer for improperly classifying its California drivers as independent contractors, notwithstanding that the drivers had all signed independent contractor agreements that provided that Texas law controlled.  Narayan v. EGL, Inc., Case No. 07-16487 (9th Cir. July 13, 2010).

EGL - an international transportation, supply chain management, and information services company headquartered in Texas - retained drivers to pick up and deliver freight in California, classifying them as independent contractors rather than as employees.  EGL required each driver to sign a "Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services" agreement that, among other things, referred to the driver as a "Contractor," provided that the parties intended to "create a vendor/vendee relationship," and in which each driver acknowledged that neither the "Contractor nor any of its employees or agents shall be considered to be employees of" EGL.  The agreements also contained a provision requiring that they be interpreted under Texas law.

Several California drivers sued EGL, claiming that they had been misclassified as independent contractors, and demanding damages for unpaid overtime wages, business expenses, missed meal breaks, unlawful deductions from wages, and other relief under the California Labor Code.  Applying Texas law per the agreement, the district court found that the drivers were independent contractors and granted summary judgment in favor of EGL.

The Ninth Circuit reversed.  As a starting point, the court refused to apply Texas law to the dispute.  Noting that the drivers sought entitlement to employment benefits under California's Labor Code and that state's statutory and regulatory scheme, the court held that it was not required to interpret the agreements to decide the case.  The court instead found that California law should apply to determine whether EGL could be liable for violating the California Labor Code.

Turning to the merits of the case, the Ninth Circuit again disagreed with the district court, finding that the drivers had established a prima facie case that they were employees rather than independent contractors.  The appellate court applied California's multifactor test in analyzing whether the drivers worked as employees or independent contractors, citing, among others, the following facts as supporting the drivers' claim that they were employees:

  • The delivery services provided by the drivers were integral to the regular business operations of EGL
  • EGL's Safety and Compliance Manual and Driver's Handbook instructed the drivers on how to conduct themselves
  • The drivers were ordered to report to the EGL station at a set time each morning
  • EGL controlled other aspects of the details of the drivers' performance, such as requiring that they wear EGL-branded shirts, safety boots, and EGL identification cards
  • EGL supplied branded equipment, such as boxes and packing tape
  • The agreement provided for automatic renewal clauses and could be terminated on 30 days' notice, which was a substantial indicator of an at-will employment relationship
  • The drivers' occupation did not require a high level of skill
  • The indefinite and lengthy duration of the drivers' relationship with EGL (some of whom had worked for EGL for several years)

The court noted that in light of these facts, the drivers' acknowledgment that they were independent contractors was not significant under California law.

In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit found that once a plaintiff presents evidence that he provided services for the "employer," the plaintiff is presumed to be an employee unless the employer can prove that the individual was in fact an independent contractor.

In light of this case, and the continuing scrutiny by federal and state agencies on the misclassification of workers as independent contractors, companies should audit and analyze their independent contractor agreements with vendors, owner-operators, or contractors, as well as the practices of its contractors, to determine whether the relationship is truly one of independence.  Where there are any questions or concerns about possible misclassification,  experienced employment counsel should be consulted to determine how best to address the situation before any company is forced to defend time-consuming and expensive litigation.

U.S. Supreme Court Voids Almost 600 Decisions Issued By Two-Member NLRB

This post was written by Daniel J. Moore and James A. Burns, Jr.

 On June 17, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “Board”) lacked the authority to issue any decisions during a 27-month period when it had only two members. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, No. 08-1457. The Court’s ruling effectively invalidates nearly 600 decisions issued by the two-member Board, leaving unclear how those cases will be resolved by a Board that is now back to a full five members, three of whom are generally expected to favor unions. A full copy of the Court’s decision is available here.

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U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Public Employer's Search of Employer-Provided Communication Devices

This post was written by Kimberly A. Craver, with contributions from Joel S. Barras, Scott E. Blissman and Eugene K. Connors.

The U.S. Supreme Court held that a public employer’s review of transcripts of an employee’s text messages on an employer-issued pager constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. City of Ontario, Calif. v. Quon, No. 08-1332 (June 17, 2010). Although the case involved a public employer, it has some important lessons for private sector employers as well.

Factual Background

Quon worked for the City of Ontario, California, as a police sergeant and as a member of its SWAT team. In 2001, the police department issued pagers to its SWAT team members to help them mobilize and respond to emergency situations. The City’s contract with its wireless service provider had a monthly character limit for each pager, and the City required officers to reimburse it for the additional fees incurred for monthly usage over that limit. When the reimbursement process became burdensome, the City reviewed the communications to determine if the existing character limit was too low for work-related purposes or if the overages were for personal messages.

An initial review showed that several officers had used their pagers for extensive personal text messaging. For instance, many messages sent and received on Quon’s pager were personal in nature, and several were sexually explicit. This prompted the Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division to investigate whether Quon had violated department rules by pursuing personal matters while on duty. The investigation concluded that he had done so, noting for instance that of the 28 messages Quon averaged per shift, only three were work-related.

The City had a “Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy” that permitted incidental, personal use of City-owned computers and equipment. The policy warned employees that personal communications could be monitored, and that employees had no expectation of privacy in such communications. Although the policy did not mention text messages, the City made clear to employees that such messages would be treated like e-mails. The police lieutenant responsible for the City’s wireless contract, however, told Quon that “it was not his intent to audit [an] employee’s text messages to see if the overage [was] due to work related transmissions.” Quon interpreted that comment to mean that the City would not examine the content of his text messages.

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Reed Smith's U.S. Employment and Labor Practice Highly Ranked by Legal 500 and Chambers USA

Reed Smith is proud to have been named one of the top employment and labor firms in the United States by Legal 500, a leading legal industry publication. The firm was highly ranked for both Labor and Employment Litigation and Labor Management Relations. Legal 500 cited in particular Reed Smith’s national reputation for experience in the areas of wage and hour and employee benefits class action defense, as well as our strong reputation for advising employers on traditional labor-law matters in diverse industries on a multi-state, regional and national basis.

Chambers USA also ranked the firm’s labor and employment practice in Pennsylvania and California as being industry leaders. In addition, seven of our U.S. attorneys were highly ranked by Chambers USA for their practices.

To learn more about the firm’s Legal 500 rankings, please click here.

To learn more about the firm’s rankings, Chambers USA, rankings or the methodology behind the rankings, please click here.

For more information about Reed Smith's Labor and Employment practice, please contact Karl Fritton, Casey Ryan, Linda Husar, Jim Burns, or the Reed Smith attorney with whom you regularly work.

UK Emergency Budget 2010 - Newsflash

The Emergency Budget announced by the Chancellor yesterday contained a number of measures (such as income tax, national insurance and pensions) which will be relevant to all UK employers. Fionnuala Lynch, counsel in the Reed Smith UK tax department has produced a summary of the key measures, with particular emphasis on the proposals affecting business taxation. Please feel free to forward the paper on to anyone in your organisation who may find the paper of interest.

Breach of contractual disciplinary procedure may lead to significant loss of earnings claims

The Court of Appeal has ruled that an employee subject to a contractual disciplinary procedure, who was dismissed for misconduct in breach of that procedure may, in principle, recover damages for loss of future employment prospects. The case of Edwards v Chesterfield Royal Hospital NHS Foundation Trust represents a significant departure from decades of established case law concerning the calculation of damages for wrongful dismissal. The decision (which we understand is being appealed) potentially opens the door to huge loss of earnings awards for employees who are unable to find alternative employment due to loss of reputation because of their dismissal.

What happened in this case?

Mr Edwards was employed by the Chesterfield Royal Hospital Trust (the “Trust”) as a consultant surgeon. In 2006 he was dismissed for gross professional and personal misconduct following a disciplinary hearing and had since then been unable to obtain work as a permanent consultant. Mr Edwards maintained that if the contractual disciplinary procedure to which he was subject had been followed correctly, he would never have been dismissed. He brought a High Court claim seeking damages for breach of his contract of employment in the sum of little under £4.3 million (including a loss of earnings claim for £3.8 million to cover his loss of employment income from dismissal to retirement at age 65).

Usually a wrongful dismissal claim would be limited to loss of earnings over the contractual notice period and, where there is a contractual disciplinary procedure, the period in which the procedure should have been followed. Since Mr Edwards’ claim went beyond this (to include loss of earnings to retirement), the Trust applied for an order from the Court that any damages which exceeded the loss of earnings over the notice period should be struck out. This matter was dealt with as a preliminary issue and for those purposes the Court only had to consider whether Mr Edwards had any real prospect of recovering, after trial, damages in excess of the loss of earnings over the notice period. For this purpose, it was entitled to assume that Mr Edwards would succeed in all the allegations made in his Particulars of Claim.

The issue finally ended up before the Court of Appeal, and the issue the Court had to consider was whether Mr Edwards was entitled to damages for loss of professional status in circumstances where, if the disciplinary proceedings had been conducted properly and not in breach of contract, he would not have been dismissed. The Court concluded that damages should not be limited to damages over the notice period and the time which the employer would have taken for the disciplinary procedure to be followed.

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Federal Contractors and Subcontractors Must Notify Employees of Right to Unionize

This post was written by Daniel J. Moore, James A. Burns, Jr. and Joel S. Barras.

Just 10 days after taking office, President Obama signed Executive Order 13496, requiring all federal contractors and subcontractors to notify employees of their rights under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including their right to join and support unions, and to include in every contract, subcontract, and purchase order, a pledge to honor the employee notice requirements. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) has now issued its final rule implementing the Executive Order, specifying how contractors and subcontractors must comply with those requirements, including a poster describing employees’ rights and how they can file claims with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and the penalties employers will face if they fail to comply. The rule will take effect June 21, 2010.

Who Is Affected by Executive Order 13496?

Executive Order 13496 (“the Order”) affects contractors and subcontractors who contract or subcontract with a federal government agency and are covered under the NLRA. The Order does not apply to the federal government, state or local governments, labor unions, or employers who are covered by the Railway Labor Act. The Order also does not apply to prime contracts under the simplified acquisition threshold, currently set at $100,000, or subcontracts of $10,000 or less.

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