The Equality Bill

The UK Government has published the long awaited Equality Bill, the aim of which is to harmonise and consolidate discrimination legislation and also tackle inequality and discrimination which continues to persist in employment and in the provision of services. Aspects of the Bill which have attracted media attention include the new public sector duty to consider reducing socio-economic inequalities and the banning of “gagging clauses” in employment contracts so that employees can be free to talk about their pay packages. The Bill also extends the concept of positive action to enable employers to recruit or promote people who are from groups which are under-represented in their workforce. Despite concerns of commentators and employers about the difficulties employers may face, the real practical impact of some of these provisions might be low. Other proposals may however have a greater impact. Large employers should note the proposed requirement to report on their gender pay gap, and the recasting of the definition of disability related discrimination should help to redress the balance between the protection of disabled persons and providing employers with the opportunity to defend the treatment that they have given. Many aspects of the Bill fall outside the employment law field but the main issues which will affect employment law are as set out below.

http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2008-09/equality.html

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Illinois Employers Strictly Liable for Sexual Harassment by All Supervisors, Even Those With No Authority Over Victims

The Illinois Supreme Court has held that under that state’s Human Rights Act (the “Act”), an employer is strictly liable for sexual harassment by any of its supervisors, even if the harasser does not supervise the victim. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human Rights Commission, Nos. 105517 and 105518 consolid. (Apr. 16, 2009). In other words, an employer is automatically responsible if any of its supervisors sexually harasses any of its employees, regardless of whether the supervisor has any direct or indirect authority over the employee.

Facts

A sheriff’s department records clerk complained that a supervisor named Yanor, who did not supervise her, pressed himself on her and kissed her, and asked her a month later if she would go with him to a motel for the night. Two months after that, the clerk received a letter on official stationery of the state public health department which said that she might have been recently exposed to a communicable or sexually transmitted disease according to a confidential source who tested positive. Frantic, the clerk reported the letter to a friend in management at the sheriff’s department. The department investigated and determined that Yanor had written and sent the fraudulent letter. After Yanor explained that he had meant the letter as a joke, the employer suspended him for four days without pay and urged the clerk not to take the matter any further.

Despite that request, the clerk filed a complaint with the Illinois Human Rights Commission, alleging in part that the sheriff’s department had sexually harassed her in violation of the Act. The Commission agreed, finding that Yanor had engaged in a series of acts “that cumulatively constituted a hostile work environment,” and because he was a supervisor, the department was liable for his conduct.

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U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Union Contracts Can Require Employees To Arbitrate Discrimination Claims

The Supreme Court has ruled that employees represented by a union cannot sue for age discrimination when their union and employer have agreed that any such claims should go to arbitration rather than court. In a 5-4 split, the Court held that so long as the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between an employer and a union “clearly and unmistakably” includes discrimination claims among those disputes that must be arbitrated, union members subject to the CBA must pursue such claims before an arbitrator rather than a judge or jury. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, No. 07-581 (Apr. 1, 2009).

Background

The CBA in this case prohibited discrimination based on “race, creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other characteristic protected by law,” including claims made under several federal laws listed by name, among them the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The contract said all such claims were subject to the CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedures “as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations.”

After the employer reassigned several union employees to other positions, they asked their union to file a grievance claiming that the reassignments violated that clause by discriminating against them because of their age, as well as running afoul of seniority and overtime provisions in the CBA. The union did so, but withdrew the age discrimination portion of the grievance before the arbitration was complete. The employees then filed an ADEA claim in federal court, but their employer moved to dismiss the suit based on the CBA provision requiring such claims to be arbitrated. The lower courts sided with the employees, holding that under a 1974 Supreme Court case, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., a CBA could not effectively waive employees’ right to bring statutory discrimination claims in court. Although the lower courts recognized that the Supreme Court had since enforced an agreement to arbitrate ADEA claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.(1991), they distinguished that case on the grounds that it had involved an individual agreement by an employee rather than a collective agreement by a union.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, holding that a CBA provision that clearly and unmistakably requires union members to arbitrate ADEA claims is enforceable as a matter of federal law. It first held that an employer and the union representing its employees are free to negotiate whatever lawful terms they believe appropriate to govern the employees’ terms and conditions of employment, and that under federal labor law such agreements should generally be upheld. The Court found that, as it had held in Gilmer, nothing in the ADEA precluded the arbitration of age discrimination claims so long as the relevant agreement clearly requires employees to arbitrate rather than litigate.

The Court rejected the employees’ argument that agreements to arbitrate statutory claims are suspect when found in CBAs instead of individual employee contracts, finding that the ADEA makes no such distinction. The Court distinguished its decision in Gardner-Denver as involving a CBA that covered only contractual disputes, not statutory claims. Here, where the CBA expressly covered statutory claims, and in light of Gilmer and other more recent cases favoring arbitration of such claims, the Court held that Gardner-Denver did not affect its conclusion.

The Court also dismissed the concern that a union and its members might have a conflict of interest over the union’s decision whether or not to pursue arbitration of a discrimination claim on behalf of certain employees. Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas said that the ADEA did not reflect any such concern, and that it was best left to Congress to decide how to resolve any such possible conflict. The Court also noted that if employees believed their union had improperly refused to pursue a discrimination claim in arbitration, they could always sue the union for breaching its duty to fairly represent all of its members or for itself having violated the ADEA. Finally, the Court held that it would not decide whether a CBA provision that allowed a union to block any arbitration of discrimination claims by refusing to act on the employees’ behalf amounted to an unenforceable waiver of the employees’ substantive rights. The Court noted that the parties disagreed over whether the union, after it stopped pursuing the age discrimination claim in arbitration, had offered to allow the employees to do so themselves, and that the parties had not briefed that issue.

Practical Effects

This decision gives employers the opportunity to avoid lawsuits and jury trials in discrimination cases by including provisions in their CBAs like that upheld by the Court, just as many employers have done through arbitration agreements with individual non-union employees since Gilmer was decided. But the decision leaves open many important questions that may limit its scope:

  • Many if not most CBAs allow only the union, not individual employees, to invoke the grievance and arbitration procedure. In such cases, if a union decided not to take a discrimination claim to arbitration, it seems likely that the courts would allow the employees to pursue their claims in court lest they be left with no way to enforce their rights.
  • Unions may be reluctant to add language to their CBAs like that in Pyett, fearing that if they do so, and then fail to pursue a discrimination claim through arbitration, the employee may sue the union for violating its duty of fair representation or discriminating against the employee.
  • Congress may accept the Court’s invitation to address the issue. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (H.R. 1020), recently introduced in the House of Representatives, would ban all predispute agreements that require arbitrating any employment dispute, thus overturning Gilmer. Although the current version of the bill exempts CBAs from its scope, that provision will surely be revised to ensure that Pyett is reversed as well. If Congress passes such legislation, Pyett may prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for employers.

Stimulus Plan Extends and Enhances COBRA Benefits

This post was written by Scott E. Blissman and Joel S. Barras.

In light of the economic downturn, public employers have been forced to consider and, in some cases, to implement layoffs as part of a greater labor cost reduction strategy to address lost tax and other revenues. While it is always a difficult decision to furlough employees, the federal government has stepped in to provide some relief to these individuals. The recently passed federal Stimulus Plan amended benefits provided under COBRA and the health care coverage continuation provisions of the Public Health Services Act. Any employer with 20 or more employees and thereby subject to the requirements of COBRA or the PHSA with an employee who has or will have been involuntarily terminated during the period from September 1, 2008 through December 31, 2009 must take action.

The most significant changes to these benefits for former employees are as follows:

  • For a period of up to nine months beginning on or after March 1, 2009, any qualified beneficiary whose employment is involuntarily terminated between September 1, 2008 and December 31, 2009 is required to pay only 35 percent of the applicable premium amount, rather than up to 100 percent of the premium.
  • Employers are reimbursed for the 65 percent of the premium they pay through an offsetting payroll tax credit.
  • The 65 percent premium subsidy is tax free for taxpayers with a modified gross income of up to $125,000 ($250,000 in the case of a joint return).
  • Employers must provide each qualified former employee with written notice regarding the availability of subsidized COBRA and PHSA premiums, the availability of an extended election period, and the individual's rights and obligations to receive subsidized COBRA or PHSA continuation coverage.
  • An additional COBRA election period allows individuals who did not elect COBRA continuation coverage as of Feb. 17, 2009, but who would otherwise be considered a qualified former employee on that date, to elect COBRA subsidized coverage. This individual will be able to elect subsidized coverage going forward, but not retroactively. Again, employers must provide a notice to these former employees regarding the extended COBRA election period and subsidy.

With regard to informing former employees of their rights to these expanded benefits, the U.S. Department of Labor released model notices to assist employers in complying with the new requirements. A brief description and a link to each model notice can be found below.


General Notice (Full version) – The General Notice is the COBRA election notice updated to include information about subsidized COBRA premiums required by the Stimulus Plan. This Notice can be used for all qualified beneficiaries who experience a qualifying event at any time from September 1, 2008 through December 31, 2009.

 

General Notice (Abbreviated version) – The abbreviated notice is an abbreviated version of the General Notice that does not include the COBRA coverage election information. It may be sent in lieu of the full version to individuals who experienced a qualifying event on or after September 1, 2008, have already elected COBRA coverage, and still have coverage.

 

Alternative Notice – Insurance carriers that provide group health insurance coverage in accordance with state law must send the Alternative Notice to persons eligible for continuation coverage under state law.

 

Notice in Connection with Extended Election Periods ("Extended Election Notice") – This Notice must be sent to any assistance-eligible individual who (i) had a qualifying event at any time from September 1, 2008 through February 16, 2009, and (ii) either did not elect COBRA continuation coverage, or who elected it but subsequently discontinued COBRA. This notice must be provided by April 18, 2009.

 

Employers should immediately begin work internally and with their outside COBRA administrators to update and distribute the required notices.

 

For a .PDF copy of this alert, please click here