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The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts certain highly-compensated employees (HCEs) from the requirement that they receive overtime pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek.  To be considered highly compensated, the employee must receive both (1) at least $684 per week paid on a salary or fee basis; and (2) at least $107,432 in total annual compensation.  To satisfy the HCE exemption, the employee must also (1) customarily and regularly perform any one or more of the exempt duties or responsibilities of an executive, administrative or professional employee; and (2) perform office or non-manual work as part of his or her primary duties.

In a recent opinion, the Fifth Circuit examined the job duties required to satisfy the HCE  exemption.  Smith v. Ochsner Health Sys., No. 18-31264, — F.3d –, 2020 WL 1897186 (5th Cir. Apr. 17, 2020).  Smith, a former organ procurement coordinator for Ochsner, sued for overtime pay under the FLSA.  In response, Ochsner asserted the HCE exemption, arguing that Smith performed one or more administrative duties and received the required level of compensation.  Smith did not contest that he met the compensation requirements, but argued that he did not perform the duties required to satisfy the HCE exemption because he was required to follow exact procedures in performing his organ procurement work and, thus, did not exercise discretion and independent judgment as required to establish the administrative exemption.
Continue Reading Fifth Circuit examines the job duties required for the highly-compensated employee exemption from overtime pay under the FLSA

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) exempts employees with certain executive, administrative, or professional job duties from the requirement that they receive overtime pay for hours worked over 40 in a workweek. Determining whether one or more of these “white collar” exemptions apply to a particular employee requires a fact-intensive analysis of the employee’s job duties. But there is another, sometimes overlooked, requirement: the employee must be compensated on a “salary basis” at a rate of not less than $684 per week. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a). An employee is paid on a salary basis if the employee regularly receives, on a weekly or less frequent basis, a predetermined amount which “is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the work performed.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(a). Employers who make improper deductions from their employees’ salaries will lose the ability to claim that the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions apply if the facts demonstrate that they did not pay the employee on a salary basis. 29 C.F.R. § 541.603.

There has been a substantial amount of litigation regarding the types and frequency of deductions from an otherwise exempt employee’s salary that will cause an employer to lose the ability to claim that the white collar exemptions apply. One area of contention has been whether an employer’s policy stating that it will make improper deductions from an employee’s salary is sufficient to defeat exempt status, or whether there must be an actual practice of making such deductions for the employer to lose the exemption. Previously, courts followed the Secretary of Labor’s view that, if an employer’s policy created a “significant likelihood” of improper salary deductions, this could result in a loss of exempt status. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). But the Department of Labor has since promulgated regulations stating that the focus is on “an actual practice of making improper deductions.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.603.
Continue Reading Fifth Circuit clarifies when improper pay deductions make an employee ineligible for exemptions from overtime under the FLSA

The Texas Citizens Participation Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 27.001 et seq. (the TCPA), Texas’ anti-SLAPP statute, is likely to receive a much needed overhaul after the Texas Senate unanimously passed H.B. 2730 on May 17, 2019. If the Texas governor signs it into law, as expected based on the bill’s broad bipartisan support in the Texas House and Senate, the revisions will take effect on September 1, 2019, and will clarify – and significantly narrow – the types of claims to which the TCPA applies. Also, importantly for companies seeking to protect their trade secrets and enforce their restrictive covenants, the changes to the TCPA would exempt such claims from its purview.

The TCPA was originally enacted in 2011 to protect citizens who exercise their First Amendment rights from retaliatory legal actions that seek to intimidate or silence them. Specifically, the TCPA allows a party to file a motion to dismiss within 60 days of service of a lawsuit if it can establish that the legal action is based on, relates to, or is in response to the party’s exercise of the right of free speech, the right to petition, or the right of association. If the party-defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then establish “by clear and specific evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.” If the defendant is ultimately successful on its motion to dismiss, the defendant is entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees.

Importantly, while a TCPA motion to dismiss is pending – and during any subsequent appeal of the trial court’s ruling on the motion – discovery and all other proceedings at the trial court are stayed. This stay can result in significant delay, which can be particularly harmful in cases in which an employer seeks emergency injunctive relief to prevent the irreparable harm associated with the use and disclosure of misappropriated trade secrets or the violation of restrictive covenants by former employees.Continue Reading Texas Legislature takes aim at Anti-SLAPP challenges

On March 21, 2019, the full en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit clarified that in order to establish a prima facie case of workplace discrimination through alleged preferential treatment of a comparator outside the plaintiff’s protected class, a plaintiff must show that the alleged comparator is “similarly situated in all material respects.” The opinion clarifies the “similarly situated” standard in discrimination cases and may assist employers in obtaining summary judgment, particularly in cases in courts located in the Eleventh Circuit, which includes Florida, Georgia, and Alabama.

In Lewis v. Union City, Georgia (Case No. 15-11362), an African-American woman sued her former employer for race and gender discrimination. In support of her claim, she identified two white men who she alleged were treated more favorably. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, concluding that the two white men were not proper comparators, but a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed.Continue Reading Eleventh Circuit holds that comparators in discrimination cases must be “similarly situated in all material respects”